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ABSTRACT
How can the designers and administrators of election rules balance the need to enfranchise
voters with the need to ensure the integrity of the vote? This tension is particularly acute
when large numbers of voting-age citizens are displaced from their permanent residences due
to war, natural disaster, or other conditions. Our article addresses the challenges of enfran-
chising refugees and internally-displaced persons (IDPs) by assessing statutory and practical
experiences of Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1996–2006. This article adds to the research on dis-
placed voters by exploring the treatment of refugees and IDPs in election laws, the debate
surrounding their inclusion, and by assessing the participation of refugees and IDPs in one
country across many elections.
INTRODUCTION
THE QUALITY of elections is measured notonly by the extent to which the franchise is
guaranteed and elections are impartially ad-
ministered for the majority of voters, but also
by accommodations to enfranchise voters who
are marginalized in the polity. Election legisla-
tion in democratic states often includes special
provisions to facilitate voting by citizens who
are elderly, disabled, institutionalized, or liv-
ing in remote locations. Due to conflicts, nat-
ural disasters, and other sources of dislocation,
many countries also confront the challenge of
voters displaced from their homes, and by ex-
tension, from their polling sites.
Enfranchising displaced voters—from vic-
tims of conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq to the
New Orleans diaspora created by Hurricane
Katrina—has been a critical concern for elec-
tion administrators in developing and estab-
lished democratic states, who face several
challenges in implementing free and fair elec-
tions. The eligibility of voters must be con-
firmed, sometimes without documentation
establishing identity or place of residence.
Voters must be assigned to vote in particular
districts—especially if elections are legislative
and constituency-based—even though they
may no longer be residents in those districts
due to displacement. Special polling sites may
need to be established to accommodate dias-
pora voters unable to return to their home dis-
tricts. Moreover, voters must have access to
information about relevant campaigns, even
though they may not be present in the region.
All of these arrangements must ensure that
voters may cast secret ballots in a secure 
environment, free from violence and intimi-
dation.
Perhaps nowhere in the world has more
time, attention, and effort been directed to the
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problem of displaced voters than in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (Manning and Antic 2003).1 Con-
flict in the Balkan region generated hundreds
of thousands of refugees and internally dis-
placed persons (IDPs), most of whom were
from the territory of Bosnia. The evolution of
Bosnia’s electoral procedures, born out of
bloody civil war in the 1990s and subsequent
formal resolution through the Dayton Accords,
provides lessons about the management of dis-
placed voters and the difficulties of maximiz-
ing enfranchisement while minimizing oppor-
tunities for manipulation and fraud.
In the article, we assess the Bosnian experi-
ence and comment on its generalizability be-
yond the Balkans. The article is divided into
three parts. First, we review extant literature on
enfranchising special needs voters. Second, we
discuss the case of Bosnia, outlining the elec-
tion laws designed to meet the needs of dis-
placed citizens and the process of developing
an election law. Third, we address the evolu-
tion of these rules in several categories (barri-
ers to registration and participation, access to
information, and the maintenance of a secure
environment promoting a free and fair contest),
focusing on implementation. This section es-
tablishes the technical and logistical consider-
ations necessary to ensure meaningful political
participation of refugees and IDPs. This article
adds to the research on displaced voters by ex-
ploring the treatment of refugees and IDPs in
election laws and the debate surrounding their
inclusion, and by tracking the participation of
refugees and IDPs in one country across many
elections.
LITERATURE ON SPECIAL 
NEEDS VOTERS
Scholarship on special needs voting gener-
ally addresses how voting technology, ballot
design, and other features of election adminis-
tration affect the ability of citizens to accurately
cast ballots. The normative basis for accommo-
dating voters who are elderly, disabled, con-
fined to homes or institutions, precluded by
employment from voting in-person, speakers
of minority languages, or minorities by virtue
of other economic, educational, and social fac-
tors is addressed in several sources (March and
Olsen 1995, Dahl 2000, Hall 2003, Wall 2003).
Governments are advised to facilitate voting by
using mobile ballot boxes, special voting loca-
tions, early voting, and absentee voting (Wall
2003). Increasingly, voting via the Internet has
been advocated as a potential solution to ac-
commodate special voting needs (McGaley and
Gibsen 2003, Mercurio 2003).2
But, discussions of accommodations for spe-
cial needs voters often raise concerns about sys-
tematic error in elections introduced by ma-
nipulation and fraud, and the systems used to
record votes. Because voters casting ballots un-
der special conditions are often those who rely
on the state for their well-being and are subor-
dinate to agents of the state, they may be more
vulnerable to coercion. Scholars have noted
that special accommodations for voters, such as
mobile ballot boxes and special voting loca-
tions, can contribute to vote theft (Sobyanin
and Sukhovolskiy 1995), though other re-
searchers downplay the likelihood of fraud 
in established democracies (Southwell and
Burchett 1997). Analyses of ballot effects in the
2000 presidential elections in the United States
demonstrated that ballot structure systemati-
cally affected the vote, artificially inflating sup-
port for one candidate over another (Brady et
al. 2001; Wand et al. 2001; Brady et al. 2004).
Moreover, several researchers note that some
voting instruments are more likely to generate
overvotes or otherwise misrepresent voters’ in-
tentions at the ballot box, especially among mi-
nority and elderly voters (Knack and Kropf
2003, Herron and Sekhon 2003, Tomz and Van
Houweling 2003).
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1 For simplicity, Bosnia-Herzegovina will henceforth be
referred to as Bosnia. Similarly, the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina will be referred to as the Federation.
2 Some scholarship has specifically addressed how certain
categories of special needs voters may be accommodated.
Goler and Selker (2006) evaluate reading disabled voters’
ability to cast ballots accurately and Berinsky, Burns and
Traugott (2001) analyze voting by mail—an approach
conducive to increasing turnout of the homebound, el-
derly, or disabled. Also, in emerging democracies where
security is in question, military and police forces are of-
ten asked to vote before election day in order to provide
security on the day of elections (Graham 2006).
Displaced voters present election adminis-
trators problems that encompass and extend
the challenges presented by other special needs
voters.3 The displaced are generally enfran-
chised through casting ballots at their home
precincts, at specially designated precincts else-
where in the country or internationally, or by
casting a mail ballot (Lacy 2004, 12). The liter-
ature specifically addressing displaced voters
is scarce, however, and focuses on the partici-
pation of refugees and IDPs in just one election
(Roberts 2003). The most active contribution to
the discussion of displaced voter accommoda-
tion has been made by non-governmental or-
ganizations, specifically the Participatory Elec-
tions Project (PEP) and its successor the
Political Rights and Enfranchisement Strength-
ening Systems (PRESS) project.4 These projects
have produced case studies and a list of rele-
vant information about election issues for
refugees and IDPs.5 In addition, the projects
have produced a document containing recom-
mended standard procedures for the inclusion
of refugees and IDPs in elections (Fischer and
Grace 2003). The need for more research on—
and international election standards address-
ing—the needs of refugees and IDPs is reflected
in a statement made by the International Mis-
sion for Iraqi Elections on the January 2005 elec-
tions. They called the Out-of-Country Voting
(OCV) program a “ . . . singular achievement,
particularly since OCV is not a required prac-
tice, even in long-established democracies”
(2005, 1). However, as noted above, managing
the needs of displaced voters has been at the
center of international and domestic efforts to
establish post-conflict democratic standards in
Bosnia.
ENFRANCHISING THE DISPLACED 
IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
Economic hardships and the fading hold of
communism eventually led to the breakup of
Yugoslavia into its constituent republics.6 Two
republics, Croatia and Slovenia, made moves
to secede in 1991. At the same time, Serbia
looked to expand its borders to include ethnic
Serbs not already living within them. After
Croatia and Slovenia broke away, Serbia en-
gaged in a six-month war in Croatia that
claimed thousands of lives. This war ended
only with international recognition of Croatian
statehood.
Bosnia’s declaration of independence from
the former Yugoslavia followed on March 3,
1992. Over the course of three years—1992 to
1995—Bosnian-Serbs and Bosnian-Croats, with
external aid, launched an ethnic cleansing cam-
paign (Kaldor 1999). The war devastated the
economy, killed approximately 200,000, and se-
verely damaged the social fabric of Bosnia’s so-
ciety. Groups—generally mono-ethnic—fled or
were forced to flee as a result of the ethnic
cleansing campaign. During the war, 60% of a
pre-war population of 4.3 million was dis-
placed: approximately 1.2 million refugees fled
Bosnia and an additional 1 million were dis-
placed inside Bosnia.7 As a result of the ethnic
cleansing campaign, Bosnia’s once multi-ethnic
landscape was effectively partitioned between
the three ethnic groups—Serbs, Croats, and
Bosniaks (Dahlman and Tuathail 2005).
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3 Voluntarily itinerant or nomadic voters encounter some
of the same difficulties of displaced voters and thus re-
quire similar accommodations. Elections in Afghanistan
are a current example, where attempts to accommodate
both itinerant and displaced voters have been used. 
An analysis of the 2005 Parliamentary and Provisional
Council elections with some focus on the issues faced 
by itinerant and displaced voters can be found here:
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/
eu_election_ass_observ/afghanistan/final_report.pdf.
4 PEP commenced in 2002 as a project directed by the In-
ternational Organization for Migration (IOM) and funded
by the US Agency for International Development (US-
AID). The project was completed in 2004. The PRESS proj-
ect began in 2004 with a grant from USAID under the su-
pervision of IOM. It was completed in June 2007.
5 See http://www.geneseo.edu/iompress/?pgmain.
html. In addition to the PRESS and PEP materials, re-
searchers at IFES have produced a general document on
refugee and IDP participation in elections (Lacy 2004).
Another project directed by researchers at the Brookings
Institution and Johns Hopkins University has focused on
the electoral participation of IDPs in the OSCE region
(Mooney and Jarrah 2005).
6 Many scholars have assessed the causes and conse-
quences of Yugoslavia’s collapse. For some perspectives,
see Bunce (1999) and Morton et al. (2004).
7 Data are from the UNHCR Sarajevo web site: http://
www.unhcr.ba/index.htm.
Eventually, the high costs of war prompted
negotiations, managed by the international
community (Cousens 2002). The warring par-
ties reached and initialed an agreement at Day-
ton, Ohio, in November 1995 and signed a 
formal agreement in December. A NATO
peacekeeping force (IFOR) and other interna-
tional organizations such as the United Nations
divided the task of implementing the peace ac-
cords. The NATO peacekeeping force was re-
sponsible for maintaining peace between war-
ring military and paramilitary groups, while
other organizations managed civil reconstruc-
tion, including elections (Daalder 2000).
The Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) provided
a framework by which the international com-
munity could approach the issue of elections
and deal with the massive population of dis-
placed persons. The newly formed constituent
parts of the country of Bosnia—the Federa-
tion of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika
Srpska—agreed that they would
. . . ensure that conditions exist for the or-
ganization of free and fair elections, in-
particular a politically neutral environ-
ment; shall protect and enforce the right
to vote in secret without fear or intimida-
tion; shall ensure freedom of expression
and of the press; shall allow and encour-
age freedom of association (including of
political parties); and shall ensure free-
dom of movement (DPA 1995, 1).
NATO was responsible for keeping the
peace, and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was given the
responsibility of election implementation and
oversight. The OSCE established the Provi-
sional Election Commission to ensure compli-
ance with the DPA and to create regulations fa-
cilitating free and fair elections.
Elections and the right of return
Article IV of the DPA’s Annex 3 details the
eligibility requirements for those wishing to
participate in the elections. It extended suffrage
to citizens 18 years or older who were listed in
the 1991 census. Among the greatest challenges
to administering elections in the territory was
the displaced population. The DPA set forth the
following rules for IDPs and refugees:
A citizen who no longer lives in the mu-
nicipality in which he or she resided in
1991 shall, as a general rule, be expected
to vote, in person or by absentee ballot, in
that municipality, provided that the per-
son is determined to have been registered
in that municipality as confirmed by the
local election commission and the Provi-
sional Election Commission (DPA 1995, 1).
One of the more controversial aspects of this
clause was the connection of political partici-
pation to return to one’s former place of resi-
dence. The law states that by casting a ballot, a
citizen confirms “ . . . his or her intention to re-
turn to Bosnia and Herzegovina. By election
day, the return of refugees should already be
underway, thus allowing many to participate
in person in elections in Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina” (DPA 1995, 1). Indeed, an entire section
(Annex 7) of the DPA is devoted to refugees
and IDPs.8 While the DPA indicates that the
concern is with the return of refugees, this
statement can also be extended to include IDPs.
Implementing the provisions provided in the
DPA for refugee and IDP return was problem-
atic. First, the return of property to the dis-
placed did not happen expeditiously and was
frequently the source of more conflict. The
problem was so acute that by 2001 when Bosnia
finally adopted its Permanent Election Law,
provisions were made to prevent people from
running for office or voting in the election if
they still occupied property that was not their
own (Election Law of BiH 2001). Second, the
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8 Article I of Annex 7 of the DPA states, “All refugees and
displaced persons have the right freely to return to their
homes of origin. They shall have the right to have restored
to them property of which they were deprived in the
course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for
any property that cannot be restored to them. The early
return of refugees and displaced persons is an important
objective of the settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The Parties confirm that they will accept the
return of such persons who have left their territory, in-
cluding those who have been accorded temporary pro-
tection by third countries” (1995, 1).
article claims that all signatories will accept the
return of the displaced. However, in the east-
ern part of the country the powerful Serbian
nationalist parties blocked most repatriation at-
tempts. Due to ethnic cleansing operations dur-
ing the war, most IDPs attempted to return to
an area where their ethnicity was the minority.
Return was as unappealing to the returnees as
to those who did not want them to re-settle in
their former homes. Thus, although return was
emphasized, the ability for refugees and IDPs
to return was limited and return was some-
times dangerous.9
The initial paradox faced in 1996 by poten-
tial refugee and IDP voters—an expectation of
return without security conditions supporting
return—was confronted three years later by
those debating the draft electoral law put forth
by the OSCE. From 1996–2000, the OSCE ad-
ministered elections based on the provisions of
the DPA and other rules and regulations
deemed necessary by the Provisional Election
Commission. Recognizing the necessity of a
formal election law, the OSCE and the Office
of the High Representative for Bosnia-Herze-
govina initiated the process in 1998. They pre-
sented a draft law to the Bosnian legislature in
1999. The key sticking point for the negotiating
parties was whether or not the election law
would include a provision that continued to al-
low displaced persons to choose their voting
location (AIM Sarajevo 2000).
In the debate that followed, the Party of
Democratic Action (SDA), a Bosniak national-
ist party, and various public voices, objected to
the right of the displaced to vote in one’s pre-
vious or current residence. They did not want
the new electoral law to encourage the dis-
placed to vote in their current residences, be-
lieving that this would contribute to the formal-
ization of increasingly distinct ethnic regions
(AIM Sarajevo 2000). However, those who had
drafted the law did not want to risk disenfran-
chising those who could not return to vote or
who did not want to vote in an area in which
they were an ethnic minority.
Despite the intense negotiations, the Bosnian
parliament eventually passed a Permanent
Election Law in August 2001. The Permanent
Election Law transferred the electoral respon-
sibilities from the OSCE to Bosnian governing
bodies. The treatment of refugee and IDP vot-
ing rights was more detailed, though it re-
mained controversial. While the OSCE had al-
ready implemented some of the new
provisions, the election law codified them.
Article 19.8 of the Permanent Election Law
deals exclusively with the issue of refugee and
IDP voting. For the purposes of the 2001
Permanent Election Law, “displaced person”
refers to an internally displaced person. It states,
A citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina who
is a displaced person and has the right to
vote under this article, shall register de-
pending on the voting option this person
chooses, for the municipality where he or
she had a permanent place of residence ac-
cording to the last Census conducted by
the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ex-
cept in the case where this person can pro-
vide proof of a change of his or her per-
manent residence in accordance with the
law, in the period from the last Census
conducted by the State of Bosnia and
Herzegovina until this person acquired
status as a displaced person, or for the mu-
nicipality where this person has current
residence and provides proof that he or
she has registered as a current resident at
least six (6) months prior to the election
day (Election Law of BiH 2001, 37).
The election law points out that a current
residence is the residence occupied by the dis-
placed person at the time of registration. How-
ever, this residence is acknowledged as tempo-
rary, to be used only until that person returns
to his or her place of permanent residence. The
section of Article 19.8 dealing with refugee ac-
commodations has nearly the same wording.
However, it does not mention current residence
because refugees could not vote in their current
residence. The Permanent Election Law codi-
fied practices already in progress, displeasing
those in favor of ethnic reintegration.
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9 By August 2000, minority movements were slight; only
360,000 of the more than one million Bosnian refugees had
returned to Bosnia (Black 2001, 186).
Other controversial provisions included a
provision in Article 19.810 that eliminated the
right to vote in a current residence by persons
occupying property that is not their own and
Article 19.911 that eliminated the right to run
for office by persons who are occupying prop-
erty that is not their own (Election Law of BiH
2001, 37–38). Originally, the DPA had attempted
to ameliorate the situation of improper residen-
tial occupation by calling for the Commission
for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons
and Refugees to handle competing claims of
property ownership. However, only 19 percent
of the 225,000 claims that were filed had come
to resolution by the year 2000 (Office of the High
Representative 2000). Thus, as the new election
law was being debated in 1999 and 2000, this is-
sue was on the minds of the negotiators and ul-
timately was included in the Permanent Election
Law. Table 1 below summarizes the issues faced
by refugees and IDPs who are covered by the
2001 Permanent Election Law.
April 2006 amendments to the Permanent
Election Law
Following the 2004 elections, new proposals
emerged to modify the existing law. The As-
sociation of Election Officials in Bosnia and
Herzegovina developed recommendations in
2005 that were subsumed under the Council of
Europe’s European Commission for Democ-
racy through Law, better known as the Venice
Commission. The Venice Commission helped
to formulate the draft law that eventually be-
came Bosnia’s Permanent Election Law and put
forth new draft amendments in March 2006.
The primary change affecting refugees and
IDPs as well as the general population was a
move from active to passive registration. The
new process is described in Chapter 3 of the
amended election law.
In brief, the new process requires citizens to
apply for an ID card with the Citizen Identifi-
cation Protection System. Those citizens who
apply for the ID card are automatically added
to the Central Voter Register, eliminating the
need to register before each election. Citizens
will only need to update their information as it
becomes necessary (European Commission for
Democracy through Law 2006). However, this
new process does not simplify registration for
refugees and IDPs. Refugees must still apply 
to vote by mail or absentee before each elec-
tion. IDPs must apply to vote in either their
place of current residence or their 1991 munic-
ipality (European Commission for Democracy
through Law 2006).
REVIEW OF ELECTIONS AND THE
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IN 
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
Since the end of active combat, seven elec-
tions have been conducted in Bosnia for na-
tional and local offices (see Table 2). The insti-
tutional rules governing these elections have
reflected the country’s contentious politics and
the challenges of satisfying the demands of
multiple, antagonistic, constituencies.12
Bosnia’s executive branch is divided into
three seats; one dedicated to a representative
of each of the main ethnic groups. Voters in the
Federation select the Bosniak and Croat mem-
bers of the executive branch; voters in Repub-
lika Srpska select the Serb representative. This
unusual method of representation in the exec-
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10 The provision states: “The citizen of Bosnia and Herze-
govina who is occupying a house or an apartment for
which s/he does not have an ownership or occupancy
right, while an enforcement document is issued by a com-
petent court or administrative authority on the restitution
of a house or an apartment, or CRPC decision, has no
right to vote in the place of current domicile, until s/he
abandons real estate property owned by others, and may
register to vote only in the municipality where s/he had
the permanent residence in accordance to the last Census
in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Election Law of BiH 2001,
37).
11 The provision states: “No person may stand as a can-
didate, hold an elected mandate or an appointed office,
who fails to vacate real estate property which is owned
by a refugee or displaced person, or fails to leave an apart-
ment where a refugee or displaced person has an occu-
pancy right, or failed to leave an apartment, which is un-
der the administration of the municipal administrative
authority responsible for housing or responsible body of
the RS Ministry of Refugees and Displaced Persons for
use as alternative accommodation. . . . ” (Election Law of
BiH 2001, 38).
12 For an assessment of institutional decisions in Bosnia
and how they reflect different theoretical approaches to
conflict resolution, see Casperson (2004).
TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS REGARDING REFUGEE AND IDP ISSUES
Issue (Section of 2001 Law) 2001 Legal Provision*
Right to vote from abroad (Article 1.5, A citizen residing abroad, either temporarily or as a refugee, has the
Article 3.4, Article 3.13) right to register and vote in the municipality where he/she is
registered as a permanent resident.
Freedom of Movement (Article 1.11) Competent authorities will ensure that no obstacles impede freedom
of movement of candidates, supporters and voters during the entire
electoral process.
Registering to vote (Article 3.4, The Election Commission… will establish… the method and
Article 3.11, Article 3.13) procedure for the entering of voters into the Central Voters Register
who… reside and submit an application for registration from
outside the territory of Bosnia… The citizen must provide proof of
residence… Once registered, the citizen must submit a confirmation
before each subsequent election. A citizen who returns before the
registration deadline must update his/her status; if after the
deadline, he/she must vote by tendered ballot.
Right to vote in 1991 residence A voter must cast his/her ballot at the Polling Station where he/she is
(Article 5.12) registered. However, if the voter has the right according to the law
to vote in his/her 1991 municipality, the voter may vote at an
absentee polling station.
Identification documents required The voter shall provide one of the following that contains a photo:
(Article 5.12) identification card; passport; driver’s license; military identification
card; a valid identification document issued by a host country; or a
refugee card issued by a host government or other international
agency.
Name absent from Central Voters If one returns to Bosnia after having registered to vote from abroad
Register because one registered out and cannot find his/her name on the final voters’ register, then the
of country and has now returned voter will be allowed to vote by tendered ballot, will add his/her
(Article 5.18) name to a special form to be signed by the voter, and will have
his/her identification retained until he/she returns the tendered
ballot in a sealed envelope.
Right to vote by mail (Article 5.21) A citizen who has the right to vote and is abroad may vote by mail.
The Election Commission shall regulate this process.
Validity of mail vote (Article 5.28) The ballot must be delivered to the Election Commission by postal
authorities by a time and date to be determined by the Election
Commission and postmarked by election day. The voter must be
properly registered to vote by mail, seal the envelope and provide a
copy of the identification documents required in Article 5.12.
Right to vote in permanent OR current A citizen who is a displaced person has the right to register and to
residence for IDPs (Article 19.8) vote in either his/her permanent residence according to the last
Census unless he/she can provide proof that this permanent
residence has changed. A citizen who is a displaced person can also
choose to vote in his/her current residence provided that he/she
registered as a current resident at least six months prior to the
election.
Right to vote in permanent OR new An enfranchised citizen who is a refugee may register and vote in
permanent residence for refugees the municipality where he/she has permanent residence according
(Article 19.8) to the last Census, unless he/she can provide proof that this
permanent residence has changed.
Occupancy right and voting A citizen of Bosnia who occupies a house while an enforcement 
(Article 19.8) document is issued, may not vote in the place of current domicile,
until he/she abandons the property owned by another. He/she may
only vote in the municipality where he/she has permanent
residence in accordance with the last Census.
Cessation of the special rights given to The High Representative will determine when the special rights of
refugees and IDPs (Article 19.8) refugees and IDPs will end. The following will be considered when
determining the date of cessation: status of implementation of
property laws and number of persons registered as IDPs.
Protection of property rights No person may stand as a candidate or hold an elected position who
(Article 19.9) fails to vacate the real estate property owned by a refugee or IDP,
or an apartment where a refugee or IDP has an occupancy right, or
an apartment managed by the RS Ministry of Refugees and
Displaced Persons. A deadline must be specified by either an
administrative decision, an enforcement decision pursuant to a
CRPC certificate, or a court decision. This person must be given at
least 30 days notice.
*all 2001 provisions taken from Election Law of BiH (2001).
utive provides each ethnic group some direct
representation, and encourages, at least in prin-
ciple, the pursuit of moderate policies.
Institutional efforts to provide descriptive
representation are also present in the rules for
legislatures. Representatives to legislative bod-
ies: the House of Representatives for Bosnia,13
as well as local assemblies in the Federation,
Republika Srpska, cantons and at the munici-
pal level, are selected using the mechanics of
proportional representation.14
The central issue in Bosnian politics is ethnic
security (NDI 1996, ICG 1998), and parties
appealing to nationally/ethnically-defined con-
stituencies have dominated the post-war Bos-
nian electoral scene.15 These parties gain elec-
toral support under the assumption that they
can best safeguard the power and security of
their ethnic brethren. While these parties have
performed reasonably well in post-conflict
elections, their vote share has declined over
time (Casperson 2004, Manning 2004b).
Some parties, such as the Serbian Democra-
tic Party (SDS) in 1996, went so far as to use se-
cessionist rhetoric to galvanize their followers
(OSCE 1996a). Formal controls were added to
control inflammatory language for the 1998
elections. In order to register candidates for the
1998 elections, parties were required to submit
party platforms on four main issues: refugee re-
turns, minority rights, economic and social af-
fairs. Provocative language in these platforms
or other campaign media could be punished by
the elimination of candidates from party lists.
In general, the parties’ greatest concerns in the
1998 elections were the economy, security, re-
turn of refugees, and the increasing number of
young people leaving the country (OSCE 1998).
In addition to stricter controls on campaign lan-
guage, the international community strength-
ened programs aimed at providing technical
assistance to opposition parties (ICG 1998).16
While approval for nationalist parties has de-
clined over time, they continue to enjoy signif-
icant support.17 However, alternative parties
have made progress. In the 2002 elections, a
wide range of parties and coalitions contested
seats (Manning 2004b). These elections were
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TABLE 2. ELECTIONS IN BOSNIA, 1996–2006
Year Election
2006* National Parliament, Collective Presidency, and Local Offices
2004 Local Offices
2002 National Parliament, Collective Presidency, and Local Offices
1998 National Parliament, Collective Presidency, and Local Offices
1997 National Assembly (Republika Srpska)
1997 Local Offices
1996 National Parliament, Collective Presidency, and Local Offices
*The elections in 2006 were the first contests since the wars of Yugoslav
secession to be administered solely by the authorities of Bosnia and Herze-
govina. Previous elections were managed or overseen by international or-
ganizations.
13 Members of the House of Peoples are indirectly selected
(OSCE 2007).
14 The specific rules governing the elections are complex
(using multi-member constituencies and compensatory
seats) and have changed over time. For detailed discus-
sions of various elections in Bosnia, see: OSCE reports
(1997a, 1998, 2003, 2005, 2007), Pugh and Cobble (2001),
Burwitz (2004), and Manning (2004b).
15 Parties such as the Party of Democratic Action (SDA)
(Bosniak), Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), and Ser-
bian Democratic Party (SDS) have been the main post-war
competitors (Pugh and Cobble 2001; Bojkov 2003; Man-
ning 2004b). Also see Manning 2004a for a discussion of
how groups engaged in conflict evolve in post-war poli-
tics. But, some change to the party system occurred by
the 2006 elections. Less narrowly-defined political orga-
nizations emerged (such as the Party for Bosnia and
Herzegovina, led by a Bosniak, but considered to be more
moderate) and competition increased within ethnic com-
munities. The leading Serb party (SDS) faced challenges
from the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, and
competition for leading Bosniak and Croatian parties also
increased (OSCE 2007).
16 The National Democratic Institute is one of the main
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working with
opposition parties in Bosnia. Read their 1996 plan to
strengthen these political parties for a summary of this
effort. http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/379_
bo_strengthpo96.pdf.
17 In 2000, SDS showed resurgence and in the same year,
Croats in Bosnia overwhelmingly voted for the national-
ist Croat party (ICG 2000). However, a drop in voter
turnout among Bosnian-Croats may have indicated dis-
pleasure with that party, the HDZ.
also the first to be administered on the basis of
the Permanent Election Law and with un-
precedented involvement by Bosnian officials.
The administration of the election was largely
seen as a success (Manning 2004b), but the con-
tinued election of nationalist parties did little
to advance the integration process (Bojkov 2003).
More recently, Bosnia conducted its first self-
administered elections in 2006. Some of the
most significant competition involved parties
representing the same ethnicity (OSCE 2007).18
The Party of Democratic Action, the party that
has received substantial support in the Bosniak
community, tried to impart a more multiethnic
image in the 2006 election campaign (OSCE
2007), though ethnic politics seem to have be-
come entrenched (Lippman 2006). Political com-
petition focused on ethnic security issues has
done little to alleviate impediments to refugee
and IDP participation and has contributed to an
environment in which they and the electoral sys-
tem have been open to manipulation.
IMPLEMENTATION OF ELECTION LAWS
The previous sections noted how formal in-
stitutional requirements proposed to accom-
modate refugee and IDP voters and described
the political background against which this ac-
commodation had to occur. This section ad-
dresses the implementation of the formal re-
quirements on the ground. While official
mechanisms were codified to enfranchise vot-
ers, these mechanisms did not always smoothly
function. We address four areas of implemen-
tation: procedural requirements for registration
and voting, access to information for citizens to
cast meaningful ballots, security arrangements
to ensure that voters were not intimidated, and
efforts to undermine manipulation and fraud
at the polls. While this section will not provide
an exhaustive review of all elections, it will
comment on how accommodations for dis-
placed voters have evolved.
Procedures
The process of voter registration and the ac-
curacy of final voter lists has been a consistent
problem in nearly all of Bosnia’s post-Dayton
elections. An accurate and transparent voter
list is one of the best ways to maintain the trust
in an electoral system while protecting the sys-
tem from attempts at fraudulent voting.19 Prob-
lems associated with voter registration for the
displaced include lack of appropriate docu-
mentation, lack of information concerning how
and where to register, and lack of time to com-
plete the required registration steps.
Rules about documentation establishing a
voter’s current residence were tightened during
the 1997 municipal elections (OSCE 1997b) to
counter widespread manipulation of voter res-
idency claims during the 1996 elections (see be-
low). The new rules particularly affected voters
in the Brcko district where 3,200 voters were
turned away due to improper documentation.
The OSCE acknowledged in its final report on
the 1997 elections that the documentation re-
quirement may have been too restrictive and
displaced persons who legitimately had current
residence were disenfranchised (1997a).20 The
passage of the Permanent Election Law in 2001
saw no change to the documentation require-
ments.
By the 2004 elections, the displaced contin-
ued to be disenfranchised because of registra-
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18 The dominant three nationalist parties faced greater in-
tra-ethnic competition with significant consequences. For
example, the HDZ lost the Croat seat in the Presidency to
a rival Croat party.
19 This sentiment is echoed in several of the documents
relating to standards for free and fair elections put forth
by various intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and
NGOs. For example, the OSCE notes: “[f]rom recognition
of the individual right to vote flows the necessity of voter
registration machinery without which, in many cases,
there would be no effective exercise of the right. Pro-
tection of the right to vote requires the establishment 
and maintenance of true and accurate voter registers”
(OSCE/ODIHR 2002, 13).
20 Both the United Nations Office of the High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights 1951 Convention on Refugees
and the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
(1998) make it imperative that governments provide
refugees and IDPs with appropriate documentation to
prove their status as citizens before the law. Principle 20
of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement states:
“Every human being has the right to recognition every-
where as a person before the law. . . . To give effect to this
right for internally displaced persons, the authorities con-
cerned shall issue them all documents necessary for the
exercise and enjoyment of their legal rights . . . without
imposing unreasonable conditions, such as requiring the
return to one’s area of habitual residence in order to ob-
tain these or other required documents” (1998, 10–11).
tion rules. The OSCE report on the 2004 elec-
tions comments that for out-of-country voting,
voters needed to “post by 2 October a bar-
coded instruction letter, a copy of an identity
document, and evidence of their voter regis-
tration with their ballot papers in a secrecy
envelope” (OSCE 2005, 22–23). This require-
ment proved to be problematic; on election day,
eleven percent of the out-of-country voters
were disqualified due to improper documen-
tation. While electoral authorities must use
documentation as a preventative tool to ward
off fraud, strict measures may disenfranchise
refugees and IDPs with a legitimate right to
vote.
In 2006, despite the passage of amendments
changing registration from active to passive,
voters still encountered registration problems,
particularly voters who did not apply for the
ID card now required for registration. How-
ever, the Central Election Commission decided
to err on the side of inclusion by allowing vot-
ers who applied after the deadline to vote by
tendered ballot. Thus, while the election law
contains strict documentation requirements,
the Central Election Commission interpreted
the rules for the 2006 election in favor of en-
franchisement (OSCE 2006). Additionally, pas-
sive registration was not available to out-of-
country voters and refugees, who were
required to apply several months before the
election.21 IDPs were required to identify
where they would vote—in the previous or cur-
rent residence—by the same deadline. The
Central Election Commission permitted 3,300
voters who lost IDP status after the deadline to
retain voting rights provided to IDPs for the
2006 general election (OSCE 2007).
In addition to the documentation require-
ments, refugees and IDPs often lacked ade-
quate lead time to receive information about
voting. Refugees and IDPs need this time to
gather the required materials and then either
travel to absentee polling stations or send their
vote by mail. A report by the International Cri-
sis Group (ICG) on the 1996 elections points out
that the under-funding of the OSCE election
administration caused delays to the beginning
of the registration process (1996b). In June, only
three months before the September 14 elections,
registration opened for the 900,000 refugee vot-
ers in over 64 countries. To register this large
number of refugees in such a short period of
time proved to be a nearly impossible task.22
This problem was eventually remedied by the
OSCE through amendments to the election law
changing the registration timeline.
The third issue with voter registration is the
quality of the final voter list. Given the com-
plexity of the registration process for refugees
and IDPs, it is not surprising that many dis-
placed voters have, at times, not found their
names on the final voter list on election day.
This problem was particularly severe during
the 1996 elections (OSCE 1996a). As previously
noted, many refugees were disenfranchised
due to an unorganized and hurried registration
period. IDPs, however, encountered greater
challenges in the act of voting. In the 1996 elec-
tions, the OSCE set up remote polling stations
close to the Inter-Entity Boundary Line as well
as a transportation network meant to help IDPs
who wanted to vote in the precincts covering
their 1991 residences. However, fifty percent of
all voters in the Federation could not find their
names on the final voters list, according to the
OSCE. In Republika Srpska, thirty-six percent
could not find their names on the final voter
list (OSCE 1996b). This complication was par-
ticularly troublesome for IDPs who had
crossed the Inter-Entity Boundary Line. Due to
security concerns, these voters were told not to
leave the premises of the remote voting sta-
tions. But, the only way to obtain permission
to vote was to leave the stations; voters who
were not on the final voters list were supposed
to travel to the Local Election Commission to
obtain a certificate and return to the precinct to
cast a ballot. Thus, thousands of IDP voters
were disenfranchised, though the OSCE claims
that this disenfranchisement did not affect the
overall outcome of the elections.23 Problems
with the final voter lists have continued to af-
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21 The deadline was July 18, 2006.
22 According to the International Crisis Group report, the
Bosnian Embassy in Vienna estimated that over 200,000
refugee voters could not be registered in time and were
thus disenfranchised (1996b).
23 However, the OSCE notes that had the municipal level
election been carried out as had been originally planned,
this disenfranchisement would have affected the local re-
sults (1996b).
fect refugees, IDPs, and other voters in Bosnia;
in 55% of monitored precincts in the 2006 elec-
tions, OSCE observers witnessed voters denied
a ballot due to some discrepancy on the final
voter list (OSCE 2007, 20).
The final procedural issue that disenfran-
chised many of Bosnia’s displaced was the ad-
ministration of absentee polling stations. The
OSCE set up absentee polling stations in 1997
within Bosnia for IDP voters who wished to
cast their ballots in their permanent residence,
as opposed to their current residence, but could
not make the journey. Likewise, for refugee
voters, absentee polling stations were also set
up for refugee voters who were able to get to
them and for whom this was a more favorable
option than voting by mail (OSCE 1997a).
Many of the problems experienced by refugees
and IDPs at absentee polling stations are in-
structive for administrators working to enfran-
chise displaced voters. For example, the OSCE
reported that many absentee polling stations
were too small, resulting in both security issues
for those waiting to go inside, and frustration
when the conditions inside undermined voters’
ability to cast a ballot. Also, the lack of materi-
als resulted in many voters not having the
chance to vote in Bosnia as well as in polling
stations for refugees in Croatia and the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (OSCE 1997a).
In 2006, the OSCE noted problems associated
with mail-ballots, particularly inconsistent de-
cisions by the Central Election Commission. In
one case, a Croatian organization sent a pack-
age of completed ballots from out-of-country
voters in violation of appropriate procedures.
The Central Election Commission returned the
ballots to voters, allowing them to re-send their
votes instead of declaring them invalid. In ad-
dition, the Central Election Commission de-
cided after the elections to invalidate 349 bal-
lots ostensibly from out-of-country voters but
bearing local postmarks (OSCE 2007, 7).
Information access
Refugee and IDP isolation from the home
community complicates their acquisition of
information about the voting process (how/
where/when to vote) and about the parties and
candidates in competition. While election ad-
ministrators have greater responsibility for dis-
seminating information about the former and
candidates the latter (Fischer and Grace 2003),
access to both categories of information is
critical for the implementation of free and fair
elections.24 Election reports suggest that in-
adequate access to information about election
procedures is a more acute problem than ac-
cess to information about parties and candi-
dates.25
Because sixty percent of the population was
displaced at the time of the first elections, par-
ties and candidates had a strong incentive to
disseminate information to refugees and IDPs.
But, while information provision can be be-
nign, it also manifested sinister characteristics;
information that was given to the displaced (es-
pecially in 1996) was often meant to intimidate
IDPs into selecting a certain municipality in
which to vote.
Violations of the rights of the displaced to in-
formation were observed by various organiza-
tions in several elections. In 1996, the OSCE ob-
served that several of the provisions in the
Copenhagen standards for free and fair elec-
tions were not met, particularly unimpeded ac-
cess to the media (Conference for Security and
Cooperation in Europe 1990, 6). Local election
observers from the Centers for Civic Initiatives
and the NGO Network of BiH (2000), noted
problems with information reaching the dis-
placed in 2000. They recounted situations from
polling stations in the Republika Srpska in
which voters from the Federation were not
listed on the final voter list and officials did not
provide accurate information to correct the
omission.
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24 The OSCE notes that “[E]veryone will have the right to
freedom of expression including the right to communi-
cation. This right will include freedom to hold opinions
and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of fron-
tiers” (Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
1990, 8).
25 Minority return has had a positive effect on political
campaigning: during the 2002 elections, cross-entity cam-
paigning increased. Parties targeting Bosnian Serb voters
that generally only campaigned in the Republika Srpska,
began to campaign in the Federation as well. The OSCE
suggested that these campaigns began in order to provide
information to minority returnees (OSCE/ODIHR 2003).
The passage of the Permanent Election Law
codified the responsibility of information dis-
semination. According to the law, the Election
Commission of Bosnia-Herzegovina is re-
quired to “publicize all Rules of Procedure,
Regulations and election results, voter infor-
mation and all other information necessary for
the implementation of this law and all electoral
laws, in the Official Gazettes and the media,
both inside and outside Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina as appropriate. . . . “ (2001, 5). In practice,
however, refugees and IDPs still found them-
selves receiving incorrect information or no in-
formation at all. In 2004, absentee polling sta-
tions were in charge of verifying the absentee
voting process; not a single absentee envelope
was rejected. However, once the ballots were
taken from the envelopes and examined, 9.7
percent were deemed invalid. The OSCE calls
this “an extremely high percentage” (2005, 21)
and suggests that this problem calls into ques-
tion the quality of voter education programs
(2005). In other words, lack of information
about how to cast an absentee ballot contrib-
uted to the rejection of almost 10 percent of
these ballots.
Security
One of the most important considerations in
post-conflict elections is voter security. Post-
conflict societies can be fragmented or polar-
ized with variation in attitudes towards democ-
racy, compromise, and tolerance. Moreover, as
was the case in Bosnia, ex-combatants and war
criminals may be active in the community.
Refugees and IDPs are particularly vulnerable
and must perceive that they will be able to
safely cast ballots to ensure participation in
elections.26 The security issue is particularly
salient if a proper network of law enforcement
and peacekeeping has not been arranged to
protect minorities or the displaced.27
During the 1996 elections, the displaced in
Bosnia who wished to return to and vote in
their 1991 residences experienced significant
problems related to limited freedom of move-
ment (OSCE 1996b). As previously discussed,
a central tenet of the DPA was that by election
day, most displaced would have begun to re-
turn to their pre-war residences with the op-
tion of voting in one’s current residence to be
used only in the most extreme circumstances.
This commitment resulted in the provision of
transportation to those who wished to vote at
their “home” polling stations. For those who
could not return, election administrators pro-
vided absentee polling stations on the border
of the two entities and elsewhere.
Despite these considerations by the OSCE,
refugees and IDPs still faced barriers to their
freedom of movement. Because a climate of se-
curity had not been achieved by election day,
the OSCE told voters wanting to cross the In-
ter-Entity Boundary Line to vote that their se-
curity could not be guaranteed (1996a). The
OSCE provided secure transportation along
nineteen routes for those who wished to cross
the boundary, but only a limited number of dis-
placed persons chose this option. Officials hy-
pothesized that voters who in July declared
that they would return to vote (rather than vote
by absentee ballot) became increasingly fearful
about crossing the border—ultimately result-
ing in their decision not to traverse it on elec-
tion day. However, the OSCE conceded that a
lack of information concerning their provision
of transportation could have also been to blame
(1996a). The OSCE’s second statement on the
elections in 1996 suggested that for the 1997
elections a concerted effort had to be made to
increase the international presence and security
measures in order for a proper environment to
exist in which to hold the elections (1996b).
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26 Election standards documents specifically denounce
any kind of violence in conjunction with elections. The
Association of Central and Eastern European Election Of-
ficials points out that citizens should not be compelled to
vote a certain way due to intimidation or violent threat
by others. It goes further to condemn violence specifically,
stating that the members agree “to take measures to en-
sure that the election campaign is conducted in the con-
ditions of public safety and calmness, to thwart any at-
tempts at violence, intimidation or similar actions or
threats in the course of elections” (2002, 1).
27 The International Crisis Group argued that Bosnia was
not ready to pursue elections in 1996 for many of the
above security reasons. Their report indicates that free-
dom of movement was almost non-existent due to the
threat of violence against those who ventured into areas
where they were an ethnic minority. The report also
found it particularly disturbing that parties in support of
known war criminals such as Radovan Karadzic were al-
lowed to compete in elections and support the war crim-
inals (1996a).
Although security at normal polling stations
on election day in 1996 was deemed satisfac-
tory, security at absentee stations used by
refugees and IDPs was poor due to inadequate
crowd control and general voter safety (OSCE
1996a). The poor security situation was exacer-
bated by disorganization manifested by inac-
curate voter lists and lack of ballots or other
necessary materials. Inadequate security
caused some stations to shut down early or not
to open at all (OSCE 1996a).
Resolution of the security problem has come
slowly. With the passage of the Permanent
Election Law, more emphasis was placed on
penalizing those parties and individuals seek-
ing to incite violence or manipulate the vote in
other ways.28 Subsequently, security and free-
dom of movement improved. The OSCE com-
mented that in the 2004 elections, “Civil and
political rights were generally respected by the
authorities at all levels. . . . Displaced persons
were free to return to their pre-war municipal-
ities both to register and to vote” (2005, 11). In
2006, the only threats to security were the use
of inflammatory nationalist rhetoric by some of
the parties. The Serbian Radical Party was pe-
nalized the maximum amount for a campaign
song using nationalism to incite violence and
hatred. Although these inflammatory instances
occurred, the OSCE report did not note subse-
quent violence (2006).
Lastly, the question of ballot security is also
of particular concern to refugees and IDPs.
Some scholars have suggested that refugees
and IDPs can become targets if election officials
count the absentee ballots of refugees and IDPs
separately from other votes (Fischer and Grace
2003). According to the Provisional Election
Commission’s Rules and Regulations for the
1996 elections, refugee and absentee ballots
were to be mixed with the ordinary vote before
counting. While this policy should minimize
risk if implemented properly, other problems
arose concerning security of the vote. Absentee
voters in Bosnia’s 1998 elections were particu-
larly fearful about casting their votes using ab-
sentee ballots due to the ballot’s faulty design.
Absentee ballots were printed on both sides of
the paper so that the voter had no way of con-
cealing his or her identity and vote from elec-
tion administrators (OSCE 1998). Finally, in
several elections, Bosnia experienced delays in
the counting of absentee ballots which resulted
in the delay of the announcement of the results
of the elections. Delays potentially undermine
the legitimacy of the elections and can result in
violence and instability.29 By the 2006 general
election, however, the security situation had
stabilized and reports of voter intimidation or
a tense environment in polling stations were
limited (OSCE 2007).
Manipulation
Refugees and IDPs are often subject to ma-
nipulation based on their vulnerability, their
dependency on states or organizations, and
their unique position of not having a perma-
nent residence. By far, the most controversial
topic in refugee and IDP voting in Bosnia has
been allowing refugees and IDPs to vote in
their future residences in the case of refugees,
and their current residences in the case of IDPs.
This provision opened the elections up to ma-
nipulation as various groups attempted to con-
vince refugees and IDPs to vote in a certain mu-
nicipality through intimidation and coercion.30
Despite standards calling for elections free of
intimidation or undue influence over voters,
substantial evidence of manipulation emerged
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28 Chapter 6 and Article 7.3 of the Permanent Election Law
detail what actions by political parties and candidates are
prohibited and in case of violation, the complaint and
penalty process.
29 The 2006 elections again experienced delays in the
count of absentee, tendered, mobile, and out-of-country
ballots—all methods used by refugee and IDP voters. At
the time of the preliminary report by the OSCE, the count
was not complete and expected to take days. The OSCE
predicted this delay would affect public confidence in the
election (2006).
30 The Association of Central and Eastern European Elec-
tion Officials addresses this issue of intimidation and co-
ercion in its draft document on election standards. It
states, “Participation of a citizen in elections shall be free
and voluntary. Nobody shall influence a citizen to com-
pel him to participate or not to participate in elections
and/or electoral actions (procedures). Nobody shall com-
pel a voter to vote for or against any definite candidate
(candidates), any definite list of candidates of a political
party (coalition) or prevent a voter from freely express-
ing his will. No voter shall be compelled by anybody to
declare how he intends to vote or has voted. It shall not
be allowed to gather and/or publish (disseminate) per-
sonal information about voters who have or have not
taken part in the voting. . . . ” (2002, 1).
in Bosnia’s post-war elections. In 1996, IDPs
were specifically targeted for coercion; most of
the observed intimidation involved Serbs from
the Republika Srpska encouraging Serb IDPs to
register to vote in their current residence inside
the Republika Srpska or to register in a future
residence inside the Republika Srpska (Inter-
national Crisis Group 1996b). Resident Serbs
hoped to secure an absolute Serb majority in
the entity and a very small Serb constituency
in the Federation. According to the Interna-
tional Crisis Group’s statement on the 1996
elections, this manipulation went unpunished
by the electoral commission (1996b). The
OSCE’s final statement on the 1996 elections
mentions nothing of this manipulation, only
citing evidence of invalid ballots that may have
been due to deliberate spoiling (1996b).
By the 1997 municipal elections, the problem
of coercing IDPs had been brought to the
attention of OSCE observers. The OSCE at-
tempted different measures to prevent this type
of manipulation, including raising the stan-
dards for documents required for registration.
As already noted in the section on procedures,
the OSCE acknowledged that this measure may
have disenfranchised some refugees and IDPs
who did not have access to the extensive list 
of documents required for them to register
(1997a). The OSCE also attempted to make the
Voter Registration Centers ethnically mixed to
avoid coercion of certain ethnicities to vote in
a specific municipality. While this goal was
achieved in the Federation and helped to limit
manipulation, the Voter Registration Centers in
the Republika Srpska remained Serb-domi-
nated, resulting in the intimidation of displaced
Serbs to register to vote in certain municipali-
ties (OSCE/ODIHR 1997a).
Another harmful technique used to manipu-
late the elections was withholding aid meant
for the displaced until they agreed to register
or vote in a certain location. Refugees residing
in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were the
most likely to experience this kind of manipu-
lation. However, the OSCE observed attempts
at manipulation in both Bosnia and the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia during the 1998 elec-
tions. The OSCE’s final statement on the 1998
elections reports that those who did not regis-
ter to vote in the municipalities preferred by
Serbian31 authorities were refused certain ser-
vices. For instance, in order to register their
children for school or to buy a car, the refugees
would be requested to present their voter reg-
istration slip. If they did not have one, they
were refused these opportunities (1998).
Refugees in Croatia experienced different
forms of manipulation, due to the campaign-
ing that took place inside the country. The
problem was instigated less by Croatian au-
thorities and more by the Croatian Democratic
Union, a Croat nationalist party that was al-
lowed unrestricted access to the refugee popu-
lations in Croatia. One claim against the party
was that its representatives sent letters to thou-
sands of Bosnians residing in Croatia soliciting
their support and encouraging them to register
to vote in the Bosnian election. Another alle-
gation that surfaced was the party’s commer-
cials being allowed to run on Croatian televi-
sion (OSCE 1998). These two acts violated the
rules regarding campaigning in the Bosnian
election laws and suggest that refugees and
IDPs faced significant obstacles to their free
participation in elections. Manipulation is a
threat in any election; however, the participa-
tion of refugees and IDPs needs to be moni-
tored closely, as the displaced are a particularly
easy and attractive target.
The most effective measure taken by the
OSCE was to punish parties that could be
clearly identified as having a role in the ma-
nipulation of the displaced. The Electoral Ap-
peals Sub-Commission was in charge of pun-
ishing the offending parties. This punishment
most often consisted of striking candidates
from party lists. According to the OSCE’s final
statement on the 1997 municipal elections, the
most serious manipulation of registration oc-
curred in Brcko and Zepce and intimidation of
registrants was also penalized in the cities of
Jajce and Caplina. Thirty-five candidates in to-
tal were struck from party lists—nineteen from
the party list of the Croat Democratic Union,
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31 The makeup of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, at
that time, was similar to Bosnia in that it consisted of two
primary political entities—Serbia and Montenegro. The
Serbian entity was most often responsible for handling
refugees from Bosnia and by extension was the most ob-
served perpetrators of manipulation.
eleven from the party list of the Serb Democ-
ratic Party, and two from the party list of the
Party of Democratic Action (1997a). The ma-
nipulation of voter registration was experi-
enced in both entities, with the most candidates
struck from any party list being those of the
main nationalist Bosnian-Croat party. While
engaging in this sort of punishment provides a
disincentive for parties who would manipulate
the elections, it also punishes candidates who
may or may not have been involved in the ma-
nipulation conducted by their parties.
The penalty process codified in 2001 was not
amended in 2006. Indeed, it seems that on the
whole, after the adoption of the Permanent
Election Law, manipulation was not a serious
problem. The final report on the 2002 general
elections by the OSCE stated that “Remarkably,
very few cases were reported of undue influ-
ence on voters or Polling Station Committee
members” (2003, 19). The quality of elections
has improved in Bosnia, with the 2006 elec-
tions—the first solely administered by Bosnian
authorities—demonstrating “further progress”
toward international standards (OSCE 2007, 1).
CONCLUSIONS
The experience of Bosnia’s refugees and IDPs
sheds light on the question of how to protect
displaced voters in electoral laws. There are a
few specific successes to take from the Bosnian
experience. First, Bosnia, like other countries
dealing with conflict-forced migrants, was
forced to decide where to allow the displaced
to vote. Allowing refugees and IDPs to choose
the municipality in which they cast their vote
gives them greater freedom and ultimately in-
creases the likelihood of their participation.
Second, Bosnia’s Permanent Election Law was
successful in detailing provisions that imposed
penalties on those that occupy the homes of the
displaced. If the displaced have a home to
which to return, then the problem of creating
an electoral scheme that protects the right to
vote of someone without a home is rendered
moot. Finally, the OSCE was more successful
at managing elections and helping to create an
electoral law that protected the voting rights of
refugees and IDPs in Bosnia’s elections than in
most countries in which it has involved itself
in post-conflict reconstruction.32 This experi-
ence points to the potentially beneficial role of
external organizations in addressing the chal-
lenges facing displaced voters.
Despite these successes, Bosnia’s experience
also illustrates the need for safeguards in an
electoral process that includes refugees and
IDPs. It is necessary to create an electoral law
that makes participation easy and manipula-
tion by others hard, though this balance is not
always easy to achieve. Remedies to problems
with procedures, information, security, and
manipulation will increase the ability for
refugees and IDPs to take part in the political
process. Their ability to freely participate is crit-
ically important to both the legitimacy of the
democratic process and the resolution of their
displacement.
The case of Bosnia is important because dis-
placement is an on-going phenomenon. Elec-
tions in post-war Iraq included accommoda-
tions for “special” voters such as the military
and police who were asked to vote before elec-
tion day to be available for work during the
elections. Moreover, out-of-country voting for
hundreds of thousands of diaspora Iraqis was
arranged in fourteen countries (International
Mission for Iraqi Elections 2005). Despite these
arrangements, details about accommodations
for IDP voters are not mentioned in official re-
ports.33 In the United States, voters displaced
by Hurricane Katrina also faced many of the is-
sues of procedural and logistical barriers to
participation in mayoral and congressional
elections. Bosnia’s electoral history illustrates
many of the complex and sometimes over-
whelming obstacles to voters who are also
refugees or IDPs. Yet, Bosnia’s experience also
points to potential solutions to the problem of
enfranchising the displaced.
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32 A report by the Brookings Institution states that in the
majority of countries in which the OSCE has been charged
with elections observation, it has not paid close attention
to the issue of IDP voting. (Mooney and Jarrah 2005).
Whereas the example of the OSCE’s actions in Bosnia
should be the rule, it is actually the exception.
33 No mention of IDP voting was made in either the In-
ternational Mission for Iraqi Elections’ election report on
the January 2005 election or the election report on the De-
cember 2005 election.
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